

Class last taught at University of Michigan in 2010.

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POLITICAL SCIENCE 663
International Organization and Integration
University of Michigan

COURSE LOCATION AND TIME:

The course meets 2-4, Wednesdays in 5769 Haven Hall. My office hours are by appointment, but do not take this as a sign that I am unavailable! (I just find that students' needs for office hours vary a great deal depending on the time of semester). Please email me to set up an appointment.

COURSE PRE-REQUISITES:

Students will get more out of the course if they have taken Political Science 660 (Proseminar on World Politics). Much of the course material has statistics in it, so a good knowledge of statistics is recommended (at least two semesters' worth). Knowledge of game theory would be helpful but is not necessary. If you are unsure whether you should take the course because of the prerequisites, please contact me and we can discuss your situation.

COURSE DESCRIPTION:

This course is partially about international integration (insofar as it was probably the central issue of interest to the founding fathers of the subfield we call 'IO'); it is primarily about international cooperation and organizations more broadly. We briefly examine some of the foundational works of the subfield, as well as the basics of regime analysis and Realist/ Liberal Institutional debates. We move fairly quickly to more recent literatures, such as the 'legalization' of world politics; treaty compliance; questions of why international law and institutions exist and what they do; and the relationship between norms and international cooperation.¹ Finally, we examine empirical studies in various issue areas such as economic affairs, the environment, security, and human rights.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS:

The course requirements are three-fold:

- (1) **15%** of your grade will be based on your participation in weekly seminars. I will give top participation grades to students who contribute meaningfully to our discussions (this generally entails the ability summarize the content of the readings, discuss their strengths and weaknesses, and relate them to other works and other areas of interest).
- (2) Each student is required to write one mini-paper and do a short presentation (about 10 minutes) on one of the weekly readings (hence, you cover the same readings in your mini-paper and your presentation). Additionally, each student will opt to do either another mini-paper for a week of his/her choosing or another presentation. The presentation schedule is posted on ctools. The mini-paper (and related presentation) should do two things: summarize the readings, pointing out commonalities and/or disagreements between the authors; critique the readings and provide ideas on ways the research could be improved.

¹ Given that Barb Koremenos is a faculty member here, I am not assigning the 2001 special issue of *IO* on the rational design of international institutions. If you do not take her course, be sure to read this.

Class last taught at University of Michigan in 2010.

The mini-paper is due (by email or on paper) by the time the class meets for the week in question. Each component of this assignment is worth 15% of your grade, for a total of 45%.

- (3) Each student is required to write a research design paper (approximately 10 pages, double-spaced) in which you identify a puzzle pertaining to the subject matter of this course, propose a potential explanation (or explanations), and discuss how one might go about testing those explanations empirically. (Note that I do not necessarily mean 'quantitatively' when I say 'empirically.' Case studies and experiments are also useful approaches!). I do not expect you to have the statistical analyses, case studies, or experiments done. However, if you have some data and feel it would be a better use of your time to write a research paper (rather than a research design paper), that is fine (I expect this may be the case for students who are further along in the program). Please discuss this with me. The paper is due by e-mail April 21, and is worth 40% of your grade.

COURSE READINGS:

All readings are articles, book chapters, or working papers. The benefit of this approach is that it keeps you up-to-date on the latest publications and on work that scholars have 'in the pipes.' The drawback is that it necessarily excludes most of the 'classics.' This course is in no way a substitute for *Classical Theories of World Politics* (Political Science 662). I have posted the (assigned) readings in an easy-to-use format on ctools, under 'resources.' Because the number of assigned readings is not *too* onerous, I expect you to come to class with a fairly strong grasp of the week's readings (ideally, the best way to do this is by reading each piece at least twice!) In addition to the assigned readings, I also provide a list of 'also recommended readings.' I do not expect you to read these during the semester, and we will not cover them extensively in class, but I do suggest that you also read them at some point during your graduate education.

COURSE WEBPAGE

You can access the course webpage at the UM ctools site for your courses. Please check it regularly.

SCHEDULE AND READINGS:

WEEK 1 (JANUARY 6)

Introduction to the Course.

WEEK 2 (JANUARY 13)

(Some) Foundational Works

- Mancur Olson. 1971. Chapter 1 of *The Logic of Collective Action*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Hedley Bull. 1977 (2002). Chapter 6 of *The Anarchical Society*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Harold Jacobson. 1984. Chapter 4 of *Networks of Interdependence: International Organizations and the Global Political System*. New York: Knopf.
- Hans Morgenthau. 1948 (1997). Chapter 16 of *Politics Among Nations*. Boston: Mc Graw-Hill.

Also recommended:

- All of the books listed above.
- E. H. Carr. 1946. *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Class last taught at University of Michigan in 2010.

- Ernst Haas. 1968. *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Economic, and Social Forces*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- ----- . 1975. *The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory*. Berkeley: UC Press.
- David Mitrany. 1976. *The Functional Theory of Politics*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

WEEK 3 (JANUARY 20)

Cooperation Under Anarchy, Regimes, and Institutional Theory

- Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane. 1985. "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions." *World Politics*, 1 (October): 226-54.
- Stephan Haggard and Beth Simmons. 1987. "Theories of International Regimes." *IO* 41 (3): 491-517.
- John Mearsheimer. 1994/1995. "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security*, 19 (3): 5-49.
- Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin. 1995. "The Promise of Institutional Theory." *International Security*, 20 (1): 39-51.

Also recommended:

- Robert Axelrod. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books.
- Robert Keohane. 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- John Mearsheimer. 1995. "A Realist Reply." *International Security* 20 (1): 82-93.
- Andrew Moravcsik. 1997. "A Liberal Theory of International Politics," *IO*, 51 (4): 513-53.
- Kenneth Oye. 1986. *Cooperation Under Anarchy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Arthur Stein. 1990. *Why Nations Cooperate*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Susan Strange. 1982. "Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis," *IO*, 36 (2): 303-34.

WEEK 4 (JANUARY 27)

"Legalization" and World Politics

- Kenneth Abbott, Robert Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Duncan Snidal. 2000. "The Concept of Legalization." *IO*, 54 (3): 401-19.
- Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal. 2000. "Hard and Soft Law in International Governance." *IO* 54 (3): 421-56.
- Karen Alter. 2000. "The European Union's Legal System and Domestic Policy: Spillover or Backlash?" *IO*, 54 (3): 489-518.
- Christian Reus-smit. 2003. "Politics and International Legal Obligation." *European Journal of International Relations*, 9 (4): 591-625.

Also recommended:

- The rest of the 'Legalization' special issue of *IO*, 54 (3).
- Martha Finnemore and Stephen Toope. 2001. "Alternatives to 'Legalization': Richer Views of Law and Politics." *IO*, 55 (3): 743-58.
- Judith Goldstein, Miles Kahler, Robert Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter. 2001. "Response to Finnemore and Toope." *IO*, 55 (3): 759-60.
- Kal Raustiala. 2006. "Form and Substance in International Agreements." *American Journal of International Law* 100 (3): 581-614.

WEEK 5 (FEBRUARY 3)

Focus on Legal Perspectives

- Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes. 1993. "On Compliance." *IO*, 47 (2): 175-205.

Class last taught at University of Michigan in 2010.

- Thomas Franck. 1988. "Legitimacy in the International System." *American Journal of International Law* 82 (4): 705-59.
- Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner. 2005. Chapter 3 of *The Limits of International Law*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- William Burke-White and Anne-Marie Slaughter. "The Future of International Law Is Domestic (or, the European Way of Law)." *Harvard International Law Journal* 47 (2): 327-52.

Also recommended:

- Many other 'legal perspectives' are scattered throughout the syllabus, but really this is a vast literature. Some names to look for in particular, in addition to those above and below: A. Guzman, O. Hathaway, H. Koh, L. Henkin, S. Ratner, K. Raustiala, R. Steinberg, J. Yoo. See also a nice synopsis by Robert Keohane. 1998. "International Relations and International Law: Two Optics." *Harvard International Law Journal* 38 (2): 487-502.

WEEK 6 (FEBRUARY 10)

Why Organizations?

- Douglass North. 1991. "Institutions." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 5 (1): 97-112.
- Kenneth Abbott, and Duncan Snidal. 1998. "Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42 (1): 3-32.
- Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore. 2004. Chapter 2 (pp. 16-44) of *Rules for the World: International Organizations and Global Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Alexander Thompson. 2006. "Coercion through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission." *IO*, 60 (1): 1-34.

Also recommended:

- Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore. 1999. "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations." *IO*, 53 (4): 699-732.
- Terrence Chapman and Stephen Jesse. 2009. "The Credibility of IO Information: and Experimental Approach." *Paper presented at the annual conference of the Midwest Political Science Association*.
- Julia Gray. 2009. "International Organization as a Seal of Approval: European Union Accession and Investor Risk." *AJPS* 53 (4): 931-49.
- Ernst Haas. 1990. Chapters 1 (pp. 1-15) and 3 (pp. 51-96) of *When Knowledge is Power*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Lisa Martin and Beth Simmons. 2002. "International Organizations and Institutions." In Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons, *Handbook of International Relations*. London: Sage: 192-211.
- Cheryl Shanks, Harold Jacobson, and Jeffrey Kaplan. 1996. "Inertia and Change in the Constellation of International Governmental Organizations, 1981-1992," *IO*, 50 (4): 593-627.

WEEK 7 (FEBRUARY 17)

Treaty Compliance

- George Downs, David Rocke, and Peter Barsoom. 1996. "Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?" *IO*, 50 (3): 379-406.
- Beth Simmons. 2000. "International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs." *APSR*, 94 (4): 819-35.
- Jana von Stein. 2005. "Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? 2005. Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance." *APSR*, 99 (4): pages TBA.
- Daniel Hopkins and Beth Simmons. 2005. "The Constraining Power of International Treaties: A Response to Von Stein." *APSR*, 99 (4): pages TBA.

Class last taught at University of Michigan in 2010.

Also recommended:

- Joseph Grieco, Christopher Gelpi, and T. Camber Warren. 2009. "When Preferences and Commitments Collide: The Effect of Relative Partisan Shifts on International Treaty Compliance." *IO* 63 (2): 341-55.
- Andrew Guzman. 2002. "International Law: A Compliance Based Theory." *California Law Review*, 90: 1823.
- Judith Kelley. 2007. "Who Keeps International Commitments and Why? The International Criminal Court and Bilateral Nonsurrender Agreements." *APSR* 101 (3): 573-89.
- Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Paul Hensel. 2007. "International Institutions and Compliance with Agreements." *AJPS* 51 (4): 721-37.
- Kal Raustiala and Anne-Marie Slaughter. 2002. "International Law, International Relations, and Compliance." In Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth Simmons, *The Handbook of International Relations*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- Beth Simmons. 1998. "Compliance with International Agreements." *The Annual Review of Political Science*, 1: 75-93.
- Michael Tomz. 2008. The effect of international law on preferences and beliefs. <http://www.stanford.edu/~tomz/working/Tomz-IntlLaw-2008-02-11a.pdf/>.

WEEK 8 (FEBRUARY 24)

Norms, Culture, and International Cooperation

- Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *IO*, 52 (4): 887-917."
- Alexander Wendt. 1992. "Anarchy Is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics." *IO* 46 (2): 391-425.
- Jeffrey Checkel. 2001. "Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change," *IO*, 55 (3): 553-88.
- James Fearon and Alexander Wendt. 2002. "Rationalism vs. Constructivism: a Skeptical View." In Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons (eds.), *Handbook of International Relations*. London: Sage.

Also recommended:

- Emmanuel Adler. 1997. "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics," *European Journal of International Relations*, 3 (3): 319-63.
- Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall. 2005. "Power in International Politics." *IO* 59 (1): 39-75.
- Jeffrey Checkel. 2005. Entire special issue: "International Institutions and Socialization in Europe." *IO* 59 (4).
- Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. *Activists Beyond Borders*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Jeffrey Legro. 2009. "The Plasticity of Identity Under Anarchy." *European Journal of International Relations* 15 (1): 37-65.
- Craig Parsons. 2002. "Showing Ideas as Causes: The Origins of the European Union," *IO* 56 (1): 47-84.
- John Gerard Ruggie. 1998. "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge," *IO*, 855-85.
- Kathryn Sikkink and Carrie Booth Walling. 2007. "The Justice Cascade and the Impact of Human Rights Trials in Latin America." *Journal of Peace Research* 44 (4).
- Alexander Wendt. 2003. "Why a World State is Inevitable," *European Journal of International Relations*, 9 (4): 491-542.

Class last taught at University of Michigan in 2010.

WEEK 9 (MARCH 3): STUDY BREAK – NO CLASS

WEEK 10 (MARCH 10)

The Impact of Domestic Politics on International Cooperation

- Read first: Robert Putnam. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." *IO*, 42 (3): 427-60.e
- Chapter 2 of Lisa Martin. 2000. *Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and International Commitments*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Jon Pevehouse. 2003. "Democratization, Credible Commitments, and Joining International Organizations." In *Locating the Proper Authorities: The Interaction of International and Domestic Institutions*. Ann Arbor: UM Press: 25-48.
- Xinyuan Dai. 2006. "The Conditional Nature of Democratic Compliance." *JCR* 50 (5): 690-71.

Also recommended:

- Drezner, Daniel. 2002. *Locating the Proper Authorities: The Interaction of Domestic and International Institutions*. Ann Arbor: UM Press.
- Sean Erlich. 2007. "Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade." *IO* 61 (4): 735-61.
- Edward Mansfield, Helen Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2000. "Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade." *APSR*, 94 (2): 305-21.
- Lisa Martin and B. Peter Rosendorff. 1997. "Democratic Politics and International Trade Negotiations: Elections and Divided Government as Constraints on Trade Liberalization." *JCR*, 41 (1): 117-46.
- Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith. 2005. "The Impact of Leadership Turnover and Domestic Institutions on International Cooperation." *JCR*, 49 (5): 639-60.
- Helen Milner and Keiko Kubota. 2005. "Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries," *IO*, 59 (1): 107-43.
- Kenneth Schultz. 2005. "The Politics of Risking Peace: Do Hawks or Doves Deliver the Olive Branch?" *IO*, 59 (1): 1-38.
- Michael Tomz. 2002. "Democratic Default: Domestic Audiences and Compliance with International Agreements." *Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association*, Boston, August 29—September 1. <http://www.stanford.edu/~tomz>.

* Note: In addition, see the vast literature on the link between domestic politics and international conflict.

WEEK 11 (MARCH 17)

International Law/Institutions and International Economic Affairs

- Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt, "Developing Countries and GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement," *Journal of World Trade*, 37 (4): 719-35.
- Jeffrey Kucik and Eric Reinhardt. 2008. "Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime." *IO* 62 (3): 477-505.
- Judith Goldstein, Doug Rivers, and Michael Tomz. 2007. "Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade," *IO* 61 (1): 37-67.
- Todd Allee. 2005. "The 'Hidden' Impact of the World Trade Organization on the Reduction of Trade Conflict." *Paper presented at the annual conference of the Midwest Political Science Association*, Chicago, IL, April 7-10.

Also recommended:

Class last taught at University of Michigan in 2010.

- Tim Büthe and Helen Milner. 2008. "The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI through International Trade Agreements?" *AJPS* 52 (4): 741-62.
- Mark Busch. 2007. "Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade." *IO* 61 (4): 735-61.
- Andrew Guzman. 2004. "Global Governance and the WTO." *Harvard International Law Journal* 45: 303-51.
- Nathan Jensen. 2004. "Crisis, Conditions, and Capital: The Effect of International Monetary Fund Agreements on Foreign Direct Investment Inflows." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 48 (2): 194-210.
- Andrew Rose. 2004. "Do We Really Know that the WTO Increases Trade?" *American Economic Review*, 94 (1): 98-114.
- Beth Simmons. 1994. "Who Adjusts? Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy during the Interwar Years, 1923-1939." Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- ----- and Andrew Guzman. 2002. "To Settle or Empanel? An Empirical Analysis of Litigation and Settlement at the WTO." *Journal of Legal Studies*, 31 (1): S205-S235.
- Randall Stone. 2008. "The Scope of IMF Conditionality." *IO* 62 (4): 589-620.
- James Vreeland. 2003. *The IMF and Economic Development*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Robert Wolfe. 2005. "See You in Geneva? Legal (Mis)Representations of the Trading System." *European Journal of International Relations* 11 (3): 339-65.

WEEK 12 (MARCH 24)

International Law/Institutions and International Cooperation on the Environment

- Ronald Mitchell. 1994. "Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance." *IO*, 48 (3): 425-58.
- Raustiala, Kal. 1997. "States, NGOs, and International Environmental Institutions." *International Studies Quarterly* 41: 719-40.
- George Downs. 2000. "Constructing Effective Environmental Regimes." *Annual Review of Political Science*, 3: 25-42.
- Scott Barrett. 2007. Chapter 3 of *Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Also recommended:

- Michèle Bättig and Thomas Bernauer. 2009. "National Institutions and Global Public Goods: Are Democracies More Cooperative in Climate Change Policy?" *IO* 63 (2): 281-308.
- Edith Brown Weiss and Harold Jacobson (Eds). 2000. *Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords*. Boston: MIT Press.
- Xinyuan Dai. 2005. "Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism." *IO* 59 (2): 363-98.
- Ronald Mitchell and Patricia Keilbach. 2001. "Situation Structure and Institutional Design: Reciprocity, Coercion, and Exchange." *IO*, 55 (4): 891-917.
- Aseem Prakash and Matthew Potoski. 2006. "Racing to the Bottom? Trade, Environmental Governance, and ISO 14001." *AJPS* 50 (2): 350-64.
- Kal Raustiala and David Victor. 2004. "The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources." *IO*, 58 (2): 277-309.
- Jon Hovi, Detlef Sprinz, and Arild Underdal. 2009. "Implementing Long-Term Climate Policy: Time Inconsistency, Domestic Politics, International Anarchy." *Global Environmental Politics* 9 (3): 20-39.

Class last taught at University of Michigan in 2010.

- Alexander Thompson. 2009. "Rational Design in Motion: Uncertainty and Flexibility in the Global Climate Regime." *European Journal of International Relations* 20 (10): 1-34.
- Jana von Stein. 2008. "The International Law and Politics of Climate Change: Ratification of the United Nations Framework Convention and the Kyoto Protocol." *JCR* 52 (2): 243-268

WEEK 13 (MARCH 31)

International Law/Institutions and International Security

- Virginia Page Fortna. 2003. "Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace." *IO*, 57 (2): 337-72.
- Erik Gartzke and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2004. "Why Democracies May Actually Be Less Reliable Allies." *AJPS* 48(4): 775-95.
- Brett Ashley Leeds. 2003. "Do Military Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes." *AJPS*, 47 (3): 427-39.
- Christopher Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein. 2002. "Why is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism." *IO*, 56 (3): 575-607.

Also recommended:

- Emanuel Adler. 2008. "The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO's Post-Cold War Transformation." *European Journal of International Relations* 14 (2): 195-230.
- Douglas Gibling. 2008. "The Costs of Reneging: Reputation and Alliance Formation." *JCR* 52: 426-54.
- Brett Ashley Leeds. 2003. "Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties." *IO*, 57 (4): 801-27.
- -----, Michaela Mattes, Jeremy Vogel. "Interests, Institutions, and the Reliability of International Commitments." *AJPS* 53 (2): 461-76.
- James Morrow. 2001. "The Institutional Features of Prisoners of War Treaties." *IO*, 55 (4): 971-91.
- -----, 2000. "Alliances: Why Write them Down?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 3: 63-83.
- -----, 2007. "When Do States Follow the Laws of War?" *APSR* 101 (3): 559-72.
- Christopher Rudolph. 2001. "Constructing an Atrocities Regime: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals." *IO*, 55 (3): 655-91.
- Alexander Thompson. 2009. *Channels of Power: The UN Security Council and U.S. Statecraft in Iraq*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Suzanne Werner and Amy Yuen. 2005. "Making and Keeping Peace." *IO*, 59 (2): 261-92.

WEEK 14 (APRIL 7)

International Law/Institutions and Human Rights

- Andrew Moravcsik. 2000. "The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe." *IO*, 54 (2): 217-52.
- Daniel Thomas. 2001. Introduction (pp. 3-23) of *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Emilie Hafner-Burton. 2005. "Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression." *IO*, 59 (3): 593-629.
- Beth Simmons. 2009. Chapter 2 of *Mobilizing for Human Rights*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Also recommended:

- Emilie Hafner-Burton. 2008. "Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem." *IO* 62 (4): 689-716.

Class last taught at University of Michigan in 2010.

- -----, 2009. *Forced to Be Good: Why Trade Agreements Boost Human Rights*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- ----- and Kiyoteru Tsutsui. 2005. "Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises." *The American Journal of Sociology* 110 (5): 1373-1411.
- Oona Hathaway. 2002. "Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?" *The Yale Law Journal*, 111: 1935-2042.
- -----, Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties? 2007. *JCR* 51 (2): 588-621.
- Eric Neumayer. 2005. "Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?" *JCR* 49 (6): 925-53.
- Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1999. *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Kathryn Sikkink. 2004. *Mixed Signals: US Human Rights Policy and Latin America*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- James Vreeland. 2008. "Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships Enter into the United Nations Convention Against Torture." *IO* 62 (1): 65-101

WEEK 15 (APRIL 14)

TBA (readings selected based on students' interests)

Class last taught at University of Michigan in 2010.

Courts

Introduction: The International Diffusion of Liberalism

Beth A. Simmons, Frank Dobbin and Geoffrey Garrett

➤ International Organization, Volume 60, Issue 04, October 2006, pp 781-810

Legitimacy and Institutional Replacement: The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and the Emergence of the Mine Ban Treaty

M. Patrick Cottrell

International Organization, Volume 63, Issue 02, April 2009, pp 217-248

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